jira VULN-36624
cve CVE-2024-26717
commit-author Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
commit 00aab7d

A while back the I2C HID implementation was split in an ACPI and OF
part, but the new OF driver never initialises the client pointer which
is dereferenced on power-up failures.

Fixes: b33752c ("HID: i2c-hid: Reorganize so ACPI and OF are separate modules")
	Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org      # 5.12
	Cc: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
	Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
	Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
	Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 00aab7d)
	Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>

… TD.

jira VULN-42729
cve-pre CVE-2024-26659
commit-author Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
commit 5372c65

The last TRB of a isoc TD might not trigger an event if there was
an error event for a TRB mid TD. This is seen on a NEC Corporation
uPD720200 USB 3.0 Host

After an error mid a multi-TRB TD the xHC should according to xhci 4.9.1
generate events for passed TRBs with IOC flag set if it proceeds to the
next TD. This event is either a copy of the original error, or a
"success" transfer event.

If that event is missing then the driver and xHC host get out of sync as
the driver is still expecting a transfer event for that first TD, while
xHC host is already sending events for the next TD in the list.
This leads to
"Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not part of current TD" messages.

As a solution we tag the isoc TDs that get error events mid TD.
If an event doesn't match the first TD, then check if the tag is
set, and event points to the next TD.
In that case give back the fist TD and process the next TD normally

Make sure TD status and transferred length stay valid in both cases
with and without final TD completion event.

	Reported-by: Michał Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/20240112235205.1259f60c@foxbook/
	Tested-by: Michał Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com>
	Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
	Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240125152737.2983959-4-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
	Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5372c65)
	Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <rnicolescu@ciq.com>

jira VULN-42729
cve CVE-2024-26659
commit-author Michal Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com>
commit 7c4650d

xHCI 4.9 explicitly forbids assuming that the xHC has released its
ownership of a multi-TRB TD when it reports an error on one of the
early TRBs. Yet the driver makes such assumption and releases the TD,
allowing the remaining TRBs to be freed or overwritten by new TDs.

The xHC should also report completion of the final TRB due to its IOC
flag being set by us, regardless of prior errors. This event cannot
be recognized if the TD has already been freed earlier, resulting in
"Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not part of current TD" error message.

Fix this by reusing the logic for processing isoc Transaction Errors.
This also handles hosts which fail to report the final completion.

Fix transfer length reporting on Babble errors. They may be caused by
device malfunction, no guarantee that the buffer has been filled.

	Signed-off-by: Michal Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com>
	Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
	Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240125152737.2983959-5-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
	Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7c4650d)
	Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>

jira VULN-42554
cve CVE-2024-26603
commit-author Andrei Vagin <avagin@google.com>
commit d877550

Before this change, the expected size of the user space buffer was
taken from fx_sw->xstate_size. fx_sw->xstate_size can be changed
from user-space, so it is possible construct a sigreturn frame where:

 * fx_sw->xstate_size is smaller than the size required by valid bits in
   fx_sw->xfeatures.
 * user-space unmaps parts of the sigrame fpu buffer so that not all of
   the buffer required by xrstor is accessible.

In this case, xrstor tries to restore and accesses the unmapped area
which results in a fault. But fault_in_readable succeeds because buf +
fx_sw->xstate_size is within the still mapped area, so it goes back and
tries xrstor again. It will spin in this loop forever.

Instead, fault in the maximum size which can be touched by XRSTOR (taken
from fpstate->user_size).

[ dhansen: tweak subject / changelog ]

Fixes: fcb3635 ("x86/fpu/signal: Handle #PF in the direct restore path")
	Reported-by: Konstantin Bogomolov <bogomolov@google.com>
	Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
	Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@google.com>
	Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
	Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240130063603.3392627-1-avagin%40google.com
(cherry picked from commit d877550)
	Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>

jira VULN-47230
cve CVE-2024-35810
commit-author Zack Rusin <zack.rusin@broadcom.com>
commit 9a9e8a7

The cleanup can be dispatched while the atomic update is still active,
which means that the memory acquired in the atomic update needs to
not be invalidated by the cleanup. The buffer objects in vmw_plane_state
instead of using the builtin map_and_cache were trying to handle
the lifetime of the mapped memory themselves, leading to crashes.

Use the map_and_cache instead of trying to manage the lifetime of the
buffer objects held by the vmw_plane_state.

Fixes kernel oops'es in IGT's kms_cursor_legacy forked-bo.

	Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin@broadcom.com>
Fixes: bb6780a ("drm/vmwgfx: Diff cursors when using cmds")
	Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.2+
	Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev <martin.krastev@broadcom.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240126200804.732454-6-zack.rusin@broadcom.com
(cherry picked from commit 9a9e8a7)
	Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>

jira VULN-37265
cve CVE-2024-26907
commit-author Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
commit 4d5e86a

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "eseg->inline_hdr.start" at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 (size 2)
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293779 at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]
 Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp stp llc rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) mlx5_core(OE) pci_hyperv_intf mlxdevm(OE) mlx_compat(OE) tls mlxfw(OE) psample nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink mst_pciconf(OE) knem(OE) vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 vfio iommufd irqbypass cuse nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs xfrm_user xfrm_algo ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_pcsp aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd snd_pcm snd_timer joydev snd soundcore input_leds serio_raw evbug nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sch_fq_codel sunrpc drm efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 psmouse virtio_net net_failover failover floppy
  [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)]
 CPU: 0 PID: 293779 Comm: ssh Tainted: G           OE      6.2.0-32-generic #32~22.04.1-Ubuntu
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
 RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]
 Code: 0c 01 00 a8 01 75 25 48 8b 75 a0 b9 02 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 10 5b fd c0 48 c7 c7 80 5b fd c0 c6 05 57 0c 03 00 01 e8 95 4d 93 da <0f> 0b 44 8b 4d b0 4c 8b 45 c8 48 8b 4d c0 e9 49 fb ff ff 41 0f b7
 RSP: 0018:ffffb5b48478b570 EFLAGS: 00010046
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: ffffb5b48478b628 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb5b48478b5e8
 R13: ffff963a3c609b5e R14: ffff9639c3fbd800 R15: ffffb5b480475a80
 FS:  00007fc03b444c80(0000) GS:ffff963a3dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000556f46bdf000 CR3: 0000000006ac6003 CR4: 00000000003706f0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x72/0x90
  ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]
  ? __warn+0x8d/0x160
  ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]
  ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0
  ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
  ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80
  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
  ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]
  mlx5_ib_post_send_nodrain+0xb/0x20 [mlx5_ib]
  ipoib_send+0x2ec/0x770 [ib_ipoib]
  ipoib_start_xmit+0x5a0/0x770 [ib_ipoib]
  dev_hard_start_xmit+0x8e/0x1e0
  ? validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4d/0x80
  sch_direct_xmit+0x116/0x3a0
  __dev_xmit_skb+0x1fd/0x580
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x284/0x6b0
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x50
  ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x20d/0x370
  ? push_pseudo_header+0x17/0x40 [ib_ipoib]
  neigh_connected_output+0xcd/0x110
  ip_finish_output2+0x179/0x480
  ? __smp_call_single_queue+0x61/0xa0
  __ip_finish_output+0xc3/0x190
  ip_finish_output+0x2e/0xf0
  ip_output+0x78/0x110
  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10
  ip_local_out+0x64/0x70
  __ip_queue_xmit+0x18a/0x460
  ip_queue_xmit+0x15/0x30
  __tcp_transmit_skb+0x914/0x9c0
  tcp_write_xmit+0x334/0x8d0
  tcp_push_one+0x3c/0x60
  tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e1/0xac0
  tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
  inet_sendmsg+0x43/0x90
  sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80
  sock_write_iter+0x93/0x100
  vfs_write+0x326/0x3c0
  ksys_write+0xbd/0xf0
  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
  __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
  do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x640
  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3b/0xd0
  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x9/0x20
  ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50
  ? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x1b0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
 RIP: 0033:0x7fc03ad14a37
 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24
 RSP: 002b:00007ffdf8697fe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000008024 RCX: 00007fc03ad14a37
 RDX: 0000000000008024 RSI: 0000556f46bd8270 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 0000556f46bb1800 R08: 0000000000007fe3 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
 R13: 0000556f46bc66b0 R14: 000000000000000a R15: 0000556f46bb2f50
  </TASK>
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8228ad34bd1a25047586270f7b1fb4ddcd046282.1706433934.git.leon@kernel.org
	Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4d5e86a)
	Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>

jira VULN-37041
cve CVE-2024-26846
commit-author Daniel Wagner <dwagner@suse.de>
commit 70fbfc4

The module exit path has race between deleting all controllers and
freeing 'left over IDs'. To prevent double free a synchronization
between nvme_delete_ctrl and ida_destroy has been added by the initial
commit.

There is some logic around trying to prevent from hanging forever in
wait_for_completion, though it does not handling all cases. E.g.
blktests is able to reproduce the situation where the module unload
hangs forever.

If we completely rely on the cleanup code executed from the
nvme_delete_ctrl path, all IDs will be freed eventually. This makes
calling ida_destroy unnecessary. We only have to ensure that all
nvme_delete_ctrl code has been executed before we leave
nvme_fc_exit_module. This is done by flushing the nvme_delete_wq
workqueue.

While at it, remove the unused nvme_fc_wq workqueue too.

	Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
	Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
	Signed-off-by: Daniel Wagner <dwagner@suse.de>
	Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 70fbfc4)
	Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>

jira VULN-37990
cve CVE-2024-35944
commit-author Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
commit 19b070f

Syzkaller hit 'WARNING in dg_dispatch_as_host' bug.

memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "&dg_info->msg"
at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237 (size 24)

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1555 at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237
dg_dispatch_as_host+0x88e/0xa60 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237

Some code commentry, based on my understanding:

544 #define VMCI_DG_SIZE(_dg) (VMCI_DG_HEADERSIZE + (size_t)(_dg)->payload_size)
/// This is 24 + payload_size

memcpy(&dg_info->msg, dg, dg_size);
	Destination = dg_info->msg ---> this is a 24 byte
					structure(struct vmci_datagram)
	Source = dg --> this is a 24 byte structure (struct vmci_datagram)
	Size = dg_size = 24 + payload_size

{payload_size = 56-24 =32} -- Syzkaller managed to set payload_size to 32.

 35 struct delayed_datagram_info {
 36         struct datagram_entry *entry;
 37         struct work_struct work;
 38         bool in_dg_host_queue;
 39         /* msg and msg_payload must be together. */
 40         struct vmci_datagram msg;
 41         u8 msg_payload[];
 42 };

So those extra bytes of payload are copied into msg_payload[], a run time
warning is seen while fuzzing with Syzkaller.

One possible way to fix the warning is to split the memcpy() into
two parts -- one -- direct assignment of msg and second taking care of payload.

Gustavo quoted:
"Under FORTIFY_SOURCE we should not copy data across multiple members
in a structure."

	Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
	Suggested-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
	Suggested-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
	Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
	Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
	Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
	Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240105164001.2129796-2-harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com
	Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
(cherry picked from commit 19b070f)
	Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>